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Zusammenfassung
In Deutschland wurde 1999 von der Kommission für Krankenhaushy-
gieneundInfektionspräventionbeimRobertKoch-Institut(KRINKO)die
3 Institute for Hygiene and
Environmental Medicine,
Medical Faculty, Ernst Moritz
Arndt University Greifswald,
Germany ‚Empfehlung zur Prävention und Kontrolle von Methicillin-resistenten
Staphylococcus aureus-Stämmen (MRSA) in Krankenhäusern und an-
derenmedizinischenEinrichtungen’publiziert.DiepraktischeUmsetzung
dieserEmpfehlungstelltdasgesamteBehandlungsteamvorerhebliche
Herausforderungen. Die mit der Umsetzung verbundenen Probleme
stellendenNutzenderEmpfehlungnichtprinzipiellinfrage,führenaber
zuanhaltenderKritikvonSeiteneinigerAnwender.IndiesemKommen-
tar thematisiert die Deutschen Gesellschaft für Krankenhaushygiene
einigekontroverseThemenderMRSA-EmpfehlungundergänztVorschlä-
ge zur praktischen Umsetzung.
Schlüsselwörter: MRSA, nosokomiale Infektion, Infektionsprävention,
Infektionskontrolle
1. Introduction and scope of this
commentary
Treatinganddealingwithpatientswhoarecolonisedwith
methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) [1], [2] or suffer
from nosocomial infections caused by MRSA, poses a
particular challenge to all healthcare facilities, such as
hospitals[3],specialistoutpatientclinics,nursinghomes
[4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9] and office-based primary care
physicians [5], [10]. In Germany, recommendations on
this topic for the inpatient sector have been published in
1999 by the Commission for Hospital Hygiene and Infec-
tionPrevention(KRINKO)[11],[12].Thecontentsofthese
recommendations do not differ essentially from compar-
able recommendations issued by other European coun-
tries [13] or US-American professional societies [14] /
Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) [15],
[16].
Regarding MRSA screening and isolating patients whose
MRSAstatushasnotyetbeenclarified,thespecifications
of the recommendations are not as strict as the “search
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Netherlands [17], [18], a directly adjacent country with
very low MRSA prevalence [19], [20], [21], [22], [23].
A commentary on the KRINKO recommendations was
published in 2004 and provides information on patients
with an increased risk of MRSA colonisation [11]. An up-
datedversionofthiscommentarywaspublishedinissue
42 of the Epidemiologisches Bulletin (2008). The aim of
these commentaries is to provide on-site support to doc-
tors in attendance, hospital infection control personnel,
microbiologists and the administrative hospital manage-
mentforestablishingalocalguidelineforMRSAscreening
[24], [25], [26].
Some challenges arise with regard to the practical imple-
mentation of the KRINKO recommendations. These
challenges do not principally question the benefit of the
recommendations but have come into criticism from
users. This criticism of the KRINKO recommendations
[27], [28] especially refers to the following aspects:
1. Relativisation of the clinical meaning of MRSA
(“MRSA is not an epidemic plague“)
2. Single room isolation and special safety measures,
such as wearing protective gowns and masks before
entering the isolation room
3. Risk of inadequate medical care of MRSA-colonised
patients due to isolation (surveillance of vital func-
tions, regular status evaluations, diagnostic and
therapeutic interventions)
4. Restricted mobility, social stigmatisation and psycho-
logical stress of isolated patients
5. SpecificconsiderationsonoperationsinMRSA-colon-
ised or -infected patients
6. How to deal with nursing and medical staff who are
MRSAcarriers;necessityofdecolonisationtreatment
of medical staff
7. Problems in pre- and post-inpatient care of MRSA-
positive patients
These points are commented on by the German Society
for Hospital Hygiene (DGKH) below.
2. Commentaries issued by the
DGKH
2.1. Is MRSA a significant infection-
epidemiological pathogen?
SomecriticsoftheKRINKOrecommendationsarguethat
MRSA is not an epidemic pathogen (Definition: highly
contagious pathogen, which results in serious illnesses
in the majority of people in case of a transmission), such
as M. tuberculosis, Y. pestis or S. typhi, and deduce from
this that standard hygiene measures are sufficient for
controllingnosocomialspread.Thisallegationismislead-
ing because
• the KRINKO recommendations [12] do not classify
MRSA as an ‘epidemic plague’;
• the measures required for preventing nosocomial
transmission of a certain pathogen are derived from
possible transmission paths and not exclusively from
its contagiousness (probability of transmission to
peoplewhocomeintocontactwithaninfectiousagent)
orvirulence(pathogen-specificproperty;describesthe
risk of illness for people who come into contact with
the pathogen or are colonised) for otherwise healthy
people.
• a pathogen, which is not an epidemic pathogen, is
therefore by no means less dangerous to infected pa-
tients. As a matter of fact, far more patients die from
nosocomial MRSA infections (e.g. pneumonia, sepsis)
in Germany than from tuberculosis, the plague and
typhoid as a whole [29].
MRSA is indeed not the cause of an epidemic plague but
still of paramount epidemiological importance as is also
shown by the following considerations.
2.1.1 Epidemiological development of MRSA
infections since 1999
Accordingtotheresultsoftheprevalencestudiescarried
out by the Paul-Ehrlich Society for Chemotherapy
(http://www.p-e-g.org/ag_resistenz/main.htm), the pro-
portion of oxacillin-resistant S. aureus was less than 2%
in 1990, 12.9% in 1995, 15.8% in 1998 [30], 20.7% in
2001 and 22.6% in 2004 [31]. Tiemersma et al. docu-
mented 8.5% MRSA in 1999, 18.5% in 2002, 19.6% in
2004, 20.6% in 2006 and 23.2% in 2008 in the EARSS
database(EuropeanAntimicrobialResistanceSurveillance
System; http://www.rivm.nl/earss/database/) [21].
The SARI project [32] highlighted the following MRSA
rates for German intensive care units: 26.3% in 2001,
22.2% in 2002, 20.8% in 2003, 19.5% in 2004, 22.3%
in2005,22.1%in2006and20.3%in2007.TheHospital
Infection Surveillance System (KISS) collects data from
more than 200 intensive care units (ICU) in Germany.
The prevalence of MRSA as a share of all S. aureus isol-
ates within this collection system rose on average from
8% in 1997 to 30% in 2003; whereby the share of MRSA
in primary S. aureus sepsis was at 37.8% and of nosoco-
mial pneumonia at 21.5 % [20], [33]. In a current review,
Gastmeieretal.[34]assumeatleast14,000nosocomial
MRSA infections in Germany per year.
Whilst this data always refer to certain selected patient
groups, a trend in the spread of MRSA in German clinics
must be assumed; this trend has been constantly on the
riseformanyyearsnow[3],[20].Somestudies,amongst
others, of the University Hospital Heidelberg [35], reveal
thattheepidemicallyoccurringnosocomialMRSAisolates
are mostly a few PFGE-identical clones, which are, pre-
sumably, particularly well adapted to the hospital envir-
onment.
Giventheincreaseinprevalence,itisnotreasonableand
irresponsible to fundamentally question the basic state-
ments of the 1999 KRINKO recommendations [12]. Im-
plementation of the KRINKO recommendations, which is
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[20], is the direct responsibility of hospital management
and operators [36], [37], [38], the hygiene experts in
charge, nursing and medical staff in attendance, and, in
addition, should also be subject to health surveillance by
the competent medical authority according to § 36 and
§ 23 of the German Infection Protection Act (IfSG) [39].
Numerous studies have proven that consistently imple-
menting pertinent prevention and control concepts sus-
tainably reduces the rate of MRSA transmissions and in-
fections [16], [18], [40], [41], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46],
[47], [48], [49], [50], [51], [52].
2.1.2 MRSA colonisation and risk of an MRSA
infection
Patients colonised with MRSA run an increased risk of
developing nosocomial MRSA infections [19], [53], [54].
Colonisation precedes infection with the exception of
cases where MRSA is directly transmitted to a previously
uncolonisedpatientwithpre-existingriskfactors(e.g.due
toalackinhygiene/antisepsisduringchangeofdressing
or when dealing with vascular catheters or respiration
equipment) [55], [56]. According to a meta-analysis of
Safdar et al., MRSA-colonised patients have a 4-fold in-
creased risk of consecutive MRSA infection (OR 4.08,
95% CI95 2.10–7.44) [57]. This is why it is necessary in
the interests of patients possibly colonised with MRSA
as well as for the sake of protecting other patients to
• examine the MRSA status of patients with certain risk
factors [22], [23], [25], [58] and
• ensurethatpatientswhoarenotcolonisedwithMRSA
(“MRSA-negative“) do not come into direct or indirect
contact with this infectious agent [26].
In order to avoid nosocomial transmissions, it is vital to
ensure that patients with proven MRSA according to the
KRINKO recommendations are consistently isolated and
decolonised even if on-site resources are not sufficient
forimplementingprospectiveadmissionscreening,and/or
until such a screening has been established [14], [59],
[60].ThenosocomialMRSAisolatesdetectedinGermany
do not constitute any risk for otherwise healthy people
without particular co-morbidities and risk factors. (Com-
munity acquired (c-)MRSA isolates with particular viru-
lence factors, such as the synthesis of the Panton-
ValentineLeukocidin,needtobedifferentiatedfromthis.
These cMRSA strains have so far been very rare in Ger-
many,andhaveabovealloccurredastriggersofregional
epidemics. The development in the US during the last 10
years shows that an increase in cMRSA infections must
probably be expected also in Germany. The preventive
measures required in this context exceed the various
aspectsofcontrolinhealthcarefacilitiesofthehealthcare
system by far but are not the topic of this commentary.)
The situation of patients with pre-existing co-morbidities
and risk factors for nosocomial infections is totally differ-
ent [19]. In case of an MRSA colonisation, at least one
MRSA infection must be expected in up to 30% of such
patients in clinical course [61]. According to the study of
Thompson et al., the incidence of MRSA bacteriaemiae
in intensive care unit patients with nosocomial MRSA
transmission amounted to 20% (15%–25%) [61].
According to a survey on MRSA infections in paediatrics,
published in 2003 [62], an average of 35% (16%–52%)
ofcolonisedpatientsdevelopedaninfectioninthecourse
of colonisation and within the context of outbreaks;
withinthiscontext,thehighratioofpublicationsonMRSA
in pre-term infants that have received intensive care
needs be taken into account [63], [64].
In a surgical intensive care unit, Vriens et al. were able
to prove that MRSA was more easily transmitted to other
patients and nursing and medical staff than MSSA [65].
Patients in orthopaedic [55], [66], and cardiac surgery
departments [56] as well as dialysis patients [58], [67]
inparticularhavehighercomplicationrisksaftersurgical
interventions if they are colonised with MRSA.
For this reason, the risk of nosocomial transmissions of
MRSA must be minimised in hospitals and other health-
care facilities by an evidence-based prevention and con-
trol concept in line with the Infection Protection Act's (If-
SG) intended purpose, as described in § 1 paragraphs 1
and2.Moreover,theattemptofdecolonisationtreatment
isrecommendedforcolonisedpatients(andpatientswith
an MRSA infection alongside systemic antibacterial
therapy) [12].
2.1.3 Morbidity and lethality
MRSA infections increase morbidity and mortality rates,
especially in patients with pre-existing risk factors, as
opposedtopatientsnotsufferingfromanMRSAinfection.
This also holds true with regard to patients who have
developed a nosocomial infection caused by methicillin-
sensible S. aureus (MSSA) [68], [69], [70].
The lethality of MRSA infections is fundamentally deter-
mined by pre-existing conditions, a particular pre-dispos-
ition for serious infections and the infection actually in-
volved (e.g. postoperative wound infection, infection of
a chronic wound, skin and soft part infection, osteomyel-
itis, pneumonia with or without pre-existing artificial res-
piration, sepsis or endocarditis).
In the studies analysed by Cosgrove et al., which refer to
patientgroupstreatedafter1990,thelethalityofpredom-
inantly nosocomially acquired MRSA sepsis ranges from
11%to58%[70].AccordingtoPateletal.andwithregard
to intensive care patients, MRSA colonisation (adjusted
odds ratio [OR], 3.7 CI95 1.5–8.9; P=.003) and the onset
of MRSA infection after the patient's discharge (adjusted
OR, 7.6 CI95, 2.48–23.2; P<.001) are linked to an in-
creased lethality risk [62].
Inacase-controlstudy,Thompsonetal.notedthatlethal-
ity increased by 21.8% (8.0%–40.1%) in intensive care
patients with MRSA sepsis [71].
Blot et al. were able to prove that MRSA sepsis results in
23.4%increasedlethality,whileMSSAsepsisdidnothave
asignificantindependentinfluenceonlethalityrates[72].
In a multivariate analysis, Shurland et al. also confirmed
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morbid patients with MRSA bacteriaemia compared to
patients with MSSA bacteriaemia [73].
Mortality of MRSA infections was between 11% and 38%
in paediatric and neonatology intensive care patients
[62], and 16.5% according to the largest study available
on this topic [74].
It is reasonable to assume that significantly more than
5000 people die from acute complications or direct con-
sequences of nosocomial MRSA infections in Germany
per year despite the possibilities of antibacterial and in-
tensive care treatments available today.
2.1.4 Expenses
Numerousstudiesdocumentprolongedperiodsofhospi-
talisation as a result of MRSA infections [43], [69]. This
is linked to higher medical expenses (compared with pa-
tients without such an event and also compared with
patients acquiring an MSSA infection). Respirator time is
significantly longer in patients with nosocomial MRSA
pneumonia compared to those with MSSA pneumonia
(17 days vs. 6 days; p<0.01) [75].
Somestudieshaverevealedthatthefinancialexpenditure
invested in MRSA prevention (screenings and control) is
cost-effective [76] and results in even lower overall costs
for the medical treatment unit [42], [43], [77], [78]. Im-
plementingapreventionplangearedtowardstheKRINKO
recommendations in clinical practice primarily involves
additional investments. For this reason, it is vital that the
key decision-makers of hospital administrations and the
medical head office are actively involved in establishing
instructionsforMRSAsurveillance,preventionandcontrol
andthattheyprovidepropersupportforboththenursing
and medical staff as well as the hygiene experts in its
implementation [26], [79], [80].
2.1.5 Consequences in public
Hospitals that do not have a written concept of MRSA
prevention and control which is firmly implemented and
geared towards the specifications of the KRINKO recom-
mendations will be answerable to the healthcare author-
ities and are at risk of coming under public pressure in
the event of an MRSA outbreak. As can be seen from
situations where there is an outbreak of nosocomial in-
fections,adeclineinpatientsmustbeexpectedifpatients
lose confidence in the safety of hygiene strategies of the
respective hospital. This particularly applies if safety
measuresarenotalreadypreventivelyimplemented,and
are instead consistently implemented in the event of an
outbreak due to a fundamental misinterpretation of the
importance of MRSA.
Since comprehensive information on MRSA is freely
available today, via Internet for instance, and many pa-
tientsandtheirrelativesactivelyreaduponit,aconstant
increase in legal actions taken by patients with nosoco-
mialMRSAinfectionsagainsthospitaloperatorsmustbe
factored in. The patients involved are now also represen-
ted by their own pressure groups aiming to improve the
protection of patients against nosocomial infections in
hospitals, and are billing doctors in attendance for the
tremendous follow-up costs resulting from complicated
pathogeneses.
The economic damage caused by legal consequences
and negative publicity can thus be substantial, leading
to a drop in referrals from physicians in private practices
or other healthcare facilities and can wreak lasting dam-
age on the hospital's public profile [81].
Hospitalswhichactivelyimplementaconcept(established
with foresight) for hospital hygiene and infection preven-
tion according to the KRINKO's recommendations and
also provide the structural-organisational and personnel
prerequisitesforthispurposeareprotectedagainstthese
consequences. Moreover, they can positively communi-
cate their investments in the fields of quality assurance
and patient safety to the public. The number of patients,
who thoroughly read up on these quality features of a
hospital before selective hospitalisation is constantly in-
creasing.
2.1.6 MRSA and glycopeptide consumption in
hospitals
MRSA prevalence in clinics and hospitals is linked to the
consumption of glycopeptide antibiotics, to the extent
that significantly more glycopeptides are prescribed in
hospitals with high MRSA prevalence [82], [83], [84],
[85]; this again increases the selection pressure for gly-
copeptide-resistantenterococci[86],[87],anothermulti-
resistant pathogen of nosocomial infections.
Documentation of the MRSA status of a patient is of
paramount importance for the empirical therapy of
nosocomialinfections(withorwithoutvancomycin?)[88].
In this context, it is also important to note that the treat-
ment of an MSSA infection with vancomycin is not con-




2.2.1. Single room isolation
NumerousstudieshavebeenpublishedsincetheKRINKO
recommendations were published. According to these
studies'findings,itisstilljustifiabletorecommendaccom-
modation in single rooms (or in common rooms in case
of cohort isolation) (Cat. IB) [16], [40], [41], [42], [43],
[44], [90], [91]. Single room isolation provides the best
guarantee for consistently implementing all required
measures for preventing and controlling further spread
of MRSA.
The nursing and medical staff, especially in specialised
departments treating very seriously ill or immunosup-
pressed patients, face the almost daily challenges in
clinical practice that construction and functional issues
4/15 GMS Krankenhaushygiene Interdisziplinär 2009, Vol. 4(1), ISSN 1863-5245
Simon et al.: Implementing the MRSA recommendations made by the ...pose;andpersonnel-organisationalresourcesdonotallow
for consistent single room isolation [92].
This problem is further exacerbated by the lack of funds
for building and refurbishment activities, under manning
[93], [94], [95], increasing prevalence of multi-resistant
infectious agents (MRSA, VRE; multi-resistant Gram-neg-
ative pathogens) and a rise in the number of intensely
immunocompromised patients [83], [96].
Since a whole set of measures is always implemented in
prevention and control [97], the single contribution of
individualcomponentsinthemulti-barrierconceptagainst
nosocomial MRSA spread has not yet been proven by
prospectivelyrandomisedtrials.However,ameta-analysis
published in 2004 concludes that implementation of the
barrier measures recommended by CDCs is to be contin-
ued [98].
The same goes for a survey published by Aboelela et al.
intheAmericanJournalofInfectionControlin2006[99].
Moreover,theauthorsofthisstudypresenttheprerequis-
ites for scientifically sound, randomised controlled trials
in a much differentiated manner and in relation to the
importance of individual hygiene measures in the multi-
barrier concept. Such trials require an interdisciplinary
study committee comprised of nursing scientists, clini-
cians,infectiologists,microbiologists,hospitalhygienists,
statisticians and administrative staff; all of which goes
hand in hand with considerable expense and manpower
requirements(estimatedmonocentricmagnitude:atleast
50,000Euro;multicentric:severalhundredsofthousands
of Euro) and are only convincing and meaningful if com-
pliance with the respective hygiene measures in both
comparison groups is systematically and continually su-
pervised.
Suchtrialsarenotpracticallyfeasibleintreatmentcentres
of German universities given the extremely limited finan-
cial and human resources.
Since no patient must receive worse medical care due to
his/her colonisation or infection with a multi-resistant
pathogen (see Point 2.3), nursing and medical staff are
routinely forced to implement different forms of contact
isolation instead of single room isolation [14].
In this respect, it has to be noted that:
• The operators of hospitals must take into account the
increasing prevalence of multi-resistant infectious
pathogens (MRE) and the increasing share of station-
ary treated patients with risk factors for nosocomial
infections, and must significantly increase the single-
room ratio in the long term (to 50% and more) so as
to effectively guarantee necessary single room isola-
tion.
• The nursing and medical staff should reach a written
agreement with the responsible hospital hygienist on
specialmeasuresofcontactisolationforpatientswho
are colonised or infected with multi-resistant patho-
gens and cannot be treated in a single room owing to
limited resources; this agreement should be counter-
signed by the medical director and the director of ad-
ministration [79], [100].
The study published by Cepeda et al. in 2005 [101] does
not provide a valid answer to the question of whether it
makes sense to isolate MRSA-colonised or -infected pa-
tients in single rooms in ICUs. Besides many other meth-




published by Nijssen et al. in 2005 [102] are neither ap-
propriate for underpinning an IA nor an IB recommenda-
tion. It is especially unacceptable in ethical terms that
nursing and medical staff was not informed about an
MRSA case which was detected in the course of this
study. This information can be life-saving for patients if
systemicinfectionoccurs,whichneedstobetreatedwith
an MRSA-effective antibiotic as early as possible.
2.2.2Specialsafetymeasures,suchaswearing
protective gowns and masks covering mouth
and nose before entering the room
MRSA is able to persist in the inanimate environment of
patients for weeks and even months after [103], [104],
[105], [106], [107], [108], [109].
Patients who are being treated together with an MRSA-
colonisedpatientinthesameroomrunanincreasedrisk
of MRSA transmission [110], [111]. MRSA is not just
transmitted to staff or other patients by direct contact
with the patient but also by contact with contaminated
objects or surfaces in the patients' environment [104],
[110], [112], [113], [114], [115]. This is why preventing
nosocomial MRSA transmission requires a great deal
more in terms of personnel for routine environment dis-
infection [104], [109], [116], [117], [118]. Methods of
applying detergents without added disinfectants instead
of adequate surface disinfectants make a sizeable con-
tribution to spreading MRSA on all “seemingly clean”
surfaces [119].
Regarding MRSA-positive patients, the pathogen is most
frequently found in the vestibules of the nose; a relevant
share, however, also colonises other parts of the body,
e.g. underarms (15%–25%), perineum (30%–40%) and
hands and forearms (40%) [104]. In the case of some
patients, an ongoing colonisation of the gastrointestinal
tract can ensue, especially after an antibacterial therapy
(disturbed colonisation resistance) [120], [121], [122],
[123], [124]. MRSA is also found significantly more fre-
quentlyontheskinofgastrointestinallycolonisedpatients
[125]. If these patients develop diarrhoea for other
reasons (e.g. antibiotic-associated), massive contamina-
tion of the patient environment with MRSA might ensue
[2].
Outlets of drainages, stomata, catheters and chronic
wounds are also reservoirs of lasting colonisation. Sur-
faces of the inanimate environment in the isolation room
are significantly more frequently contaminated in the
case of patients with perineal MRSA colonisation [126].
The tenacity (resistance to unfavourable environmental
factors) and spreading tendency of nosocomial MRSA
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isation of a patient statically and on the basis of a single
swab series because the number of colonised areas can
change daily.
For example, an “only nasally” colonised patient who
catches a cold in hospital or coughs for other reasons
(asthma, COPD, smoker), can become the starting point
of massive MRSA contamination to the environment
without a mask covering mouth and nose.
Many people often unconsciously touch their noses and
thuspossiblycontaminatetheirhandsandsubsequently
their environment with MRSA. If a mask covering mouth
and nose is always worn outside the isolation room (in
addition to hygienic hand disinfection) the probability of
such a “hygiene error” is decreased.
Inaddition,asignificantpartofMRSA-colonisedpatients
is not able to consistently stick to the required hygiene
measures [127]. Problems in terms of compliance with
hand hygiene [128], [129], [130], [131], [132], [133],
[134] or the use of disposable gloves [135] arise again
and again, even in case of well-trained and experienced
nursing or medical service staff. In this context, it is un-
realistic to act on the assumption of the ideal of a well-
informed,judiciousandcooperativepatientwhoimmedi-
ately and completely grasps all barrier measures and is
able to consistently implement them [127], [136], [137].
There is an increased likelihood that nursing scrubs will
be contaminated if additional, patient-related protective
gowns are not worn [84], [104], [116], [138]. Since cer-
tain zones of nursing scrubs and objects [139] (bags,
pagers, computers, ball-pens etc.) frequently come into
contact with hands [140], [141], [142], [143], [144] in
clinical practice, a pathogen might be secondarily trans-
mitted from contaminated nursing scrubs to the hands
of nursing and medical staff. Moreover, MRSA can be
transmitted through droplet infection in case of nasal or
pharyngeal colonisation or infections of the deeper res-
piratory tract. This by no means only applies to patients
with infections of the upper airways or tracheostoma, al-
though the risk is significantly increased in these situ-
ations [84].
Protectivegownsstoredintheroomcanbecontaminated
with MRSA before use. In this respect, it is advisable to
storefreshprotectivegownsinfrontoftheisolationroom,
in the sluice area or in a specific “MRSA carriage” [40],
and to put on the protective gown and the mask covering
mouth and nose before entering the isolation room and
dispose of them when leaving the room.
Staff who wear a mask covering mouth and nose in the
isolationroom/(area),disposeofthismaskwhenleaving
the room/(area) and subsequently disinfect their hands
have a reduced probability of unconsciously touching
their own nasal mucosa with contaminated gloves.
Without discussing all specific shortfalls in conception
and implementation in detail, it is merely worth noting
that neither the examination on “droplet precautions”
[145]publishedbyManginietal.in2007northerandom-
isedmonocentrictrialonwearingprotectivegowns[146]
published by Grant et al. in 2006 meet the method re-
quirements of a sound and convincing scientific study
regarding all these important problems and questions.
For this reason, these papers should on no account be
quoted as if their conclusions were scientifically proven
facts.
2.2.3. Specific considerations on operations in
MRSA-colonised or -infected patients
• The question of when a patient will be operated is
answeredbythemedicalindicationsfortheoperation,
and not the MRSA colonisation status.
• Elective operations should always be postponed if
sufficient time for a promising decolonisation attempt
is available.
• Necessarydiagnosticandsmallertherapeuticinterven-
tions can also be performed in procedures rooms –
instead of isolation rooms – if firmly established pro-
cedures controlled by the hospital hygienist and hy-
giene experts for prevention and control (including
subsequent disinfection) are guaranteed.
• Disinfectant intermediate cleaning is extended to the
patient-remote area (floors, not walls) in case of
probable release of MRSA during the operation to the
environment (e.g. MRSA colonisation or infection in
the operation area). Before preparing the new opera-
tion drying of the disinfectant must be awaited.
• The operating team must go through the airlock again
in case of probable contamination of the surgery
team's scrubs (including a change of shoes).
2.3. Do MRSA patients get worse
medical/nursing care?
An oft-cited study by Stelfox et al. [147], and also other
studies [148] has suggested that patients who were
isolated due to a colonisation or infection with multi-re-
sistant pathogens
• are less frequently monitored and examined [149];
• show more complications in clinical course; these
complications could possibly be prevented in case of
better continuous care.
Theseproblemsandtheassociatedethicalquestionsare
not specific to MRSA [150], [151], [152]. Wheninterpret-
ing the aforementioned studies it has to be considered
thoughthattheyaremerelyobservationalstudieswithout
intervention. Yet, section 7 of the KRINKO recommenda-
tions needs to be specified for ethical reasons:
• On principle, colonisation or infection with a multi-
resistantpathogenmustnotresultinpatientsreceiving
worse medical care and being denied medically indi-
cated diagnostic and therapeutic measures.
• HospitalstreatingMRE-colonisedor-infectedpatients
must create the structural-organisational and staff
requirementssuchthatthenecessarymedicalsurveil-
lance and care is also guaranteed for patients who
must be isolated for reasons of infection prevention.
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cedures in an MRE-colonised patient in the isolation
roommustnotresultinanincreasedriskofundesired
complications or worse surveillance of vital functions
during or after the intervention.
2.4. Do the isolation measures result in
restrictions in mobility, social
stigmatisation and psychological stress
of patients?
Patients who are isolated in an isolation room or in a
correspondingly marked area due to an MRSA colonisa-
tion or infection
• are restricted in their mobility;
• runanincreasedriskofsocialisolationandstigmatisa-
tion;
• are exposed to additional psychological stress [153];
• are possibly unhappy with medical care.
Theseaspectsoftheutmostpracticalimportancearenot
discussed in the KRINKO recommendations of 1999. In
anobservationalstudy,increasedanxietyanddepression
scores in isolated patients (because of MRSA or VRE)
werefoundafterjustoneweek[154].Theauthorsofthis
investigation point out that it is merely an observational
study without intervention.
They quote studies from the field of protective isolation
withinthecontextofallogeneicstemcelltransplantations;
these problems were anticipated in these studies and
could be alleviated by suitable interventions.
Reference to studies discussing psychological stress of
patientsandrelativesinthecourseoftheSARSepidemic
[155], [156] is not appropriate in this paper because
separating patients from their relatives (or even separat-
ing children from their parents) is not necessary in case
of an MRSA colonisation.
The following measures can be helpful:
• Cooperative, judicious and mobile patients should be
allowed to leave the isolation room, e.g. to go for a
walk in the clinic's garden, after a written agreement
has been made and a consultation with a physician
hastakenplace.Itisself-evidentthatdirectorindirect
contacts with other patients must be avoided.
• Incaseofnasalorpharyngealcolonisation,thepatient
must wear a mask covering mouth and nose when
leavingtheroom.AllMRSA-colonisedwoundsmustbe
covered meticulously with an adequate, liquid-proof
dressing.
• A specific treatment plan should be set up in conjunc-
tion with the hospital hygienist (hygiene experts) for
patients who need physiotherapy treatment which




to special safety measures, both seen to by the
physiotherapists.
• Isolation rooms for patients who can otherwise unres-
trictedly communicate with their fellow patients and
relatives should be equipped with a telephone, with
radio, and with television but it has to be ensured that
control panels can be regularly disinfected.
• Transparent face protection shields instead of the
usual mask covering mouth and nose should be de-
veloped for treating children and other patients who
notablyrelyonnon-verbalcommunication(reassuring
andfriendlysignals,suchassmilingetc.);theseshields
must protect against droplet infections.
• Physicians and nurses explaining the necessity of
isolation should also actively address the problem of
additional psychological stress.
• When calculating the necessary working time with pa-
tients, medical staff should allow for extra time for
talking to patients.
• The indication for professional psychological care of
selectedpatientsisgivenbythedoctorsinattendance.
The risk of social stigmatisation can be reduced by:
• Marking the room's door with the information “intens-
ive care” (the following safety measures must be ad-
hered to, visitors should report to the ward staff...) in-
stead of a warning sign which publicly communicates
the patient's colonisation state without permission.
• Information material informing patients and relatives
about the meaning, transmission paths and required
prevention and control measures of MRE [157].
• Computer-aided automated alerts can be used in
clinics with a digital patient documentation system for
immediately isolating patients with known or highly
likelyMRSAcolonisationuponthepatients'admissions
in such a way that patients must not be transferred
from a common room during their hospitalisation
[158], [159].
Patients' satisfaction with their medical care does not
depend on the question of whether they are isolated or
not,ifthenecessaryextratimeisconsideredinstructural
andorganisationaltermsandifmanagementispurpose-
ful and far-sighted [160]. On the contrary, clinical experi-
ence often shows that patients properly cared for in this
context feel particularly safe and experience the extra
time allocated to them as positive [161].
It basically makes sense to instruct patients as partners
inpreventingnosocomialinfectionsandalsorecommend
hygienic hand disinfection to them (the same being ap-
plicable to nursing and medical staff) [137].
2.5. How to deal with medical and
nursing staff who are MRSA carriers
According to a current survey [162], medical and nursing
staff are more frequently colonised with MRSA [114],
[118], [163] and are more often involved in nosocomial
transmissions than originally thought [164]. The authors
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matic, MRSA-colonised staff to patients was proven with
molecular biological typing methods, and 26 studies, in
which such a transmission was very likely in epidemiolo-
gical terms.
The hospital hygienist in charge, the clinic management
and the on-site occupational health officer must decide
onthenecessaryprocedureregardingstaffscreeningfor




often want to be tested themselves if “their patients”
have been found to have MRSA. This shows strongly de-
velopedhygieneawareness.Testingshouldthusbemade
possible after consultation of the hygiene experts. The
same survey [162] makes further important information
accessible:
• 5% of all MRSA-positive staff (48 of 942 examined
staff with available information) fell ill with an MRSA
infection themselves.
• Inadditiontonoseswabs,pharynxswabsarerequired
to safely exclude MRSA colonisation [165], [166],
[167].
• The success rate of an antiseptic decolonisation
treatment combined with mupirocin nose ointment is
excellentformedicalstaff(90%after5days;93%after
10daysMupirocinplusoralantibiotics,e.g.rifampicin
and cotrimoxazole or doxycyclin). Additional benefits
of supplementary preventive treatments with certain
antibiotics(accordingtoinvitrosensitivitytesting,e.g.
rifampicin,cotrimoxazole)havetobecarefullyweighed
up against undesired effects to be expected.
• In case of some staff, underlying diseases, such as
chronic sinusitis [168], otitis externa [169] or chronic
hand eczema [170] need to be treated concomitantly
to obtain long-term decolonisation.
• The domestic area (including certain pets) should be
included in the respective intervention strategy [171],
[172], [173], especially in case of staff who cannot be
treated successfully.
The question of whether it is reasonable to temporarily
releaseMRSA-colonisedstafffromnear-patientactivities
during a decolonisation treatment must be decided on
thejobinawrittenstandard,thedraftingofwhichshould
include all relevant occupational groups including clinic
management and administration.
Absenteeism must not be declared as “sick leave” in this
context, and the costs for the decolonisation treatment
of staff are to be borne by the hospital.
Sinceundermanningofnursingstaffisitselfanindepend-
ent risk factor for MRSA transmission in the context of
outbreaks [94], [174], staff released from their duties
must be temporarily replaced by additional staff.
If this is not possible MRSA-colonised staff should exclu-
sively nurse MRSA-colonised patients – after another in-
tensivebriefingregardingthenecessarybarriermeasures
– until they have successfully been decolonised them-
selves.
2.6. Problems in the pre- and post-
inpatient care area
SincenotallMRSA-colonisedpatientshavebeensuccess-
fully treated by the end of their hospitalisation [10], and
thedurationofinpatienttreatmentofpatientsisdeclining
as a whole, more and more MRSA-colonised/-infected
patients are discharged to outpatient care or to other
treatment facilities (e.g. old people's homes and nursing
homes) [4].
Further medical treatment of these patients is provided
by physicians in private practices or specialist outpatient
clinics, and many of these people are cared for by outpa-
tient nursing services [175].
The special costs that are incurred by eradication treat-
ment [176], microbiological follow-up or the extra time
inoutpatientcareofMRSA-colonisedor-infectedpatients
have not been creditable so far. This funding void also
affects MRSA screening of patients with increased risk
of MRSA colonisation before elective inpatient hospital-
isation [26], [78] as well as MRSA screening of family
members of MRSA-positive patients. In this field, urgent
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